The Thai Drug Users' Network (TDN) formed in 2002 in response to the deplorable health and human rights conditions facing illicit drug users in Thailand. In 2003, TDN submitted a proposal for funding to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM). The proposal appeared destined to fail as it did not have the support of the Thai government and because the interventions proposed were highly incongruent with national policies. In the midst of an ongoing drug war, TDN took action to increase awareness of the harms of the drug war, the shortcomings in GFATM policies, and the need for peer-driven interventions. This article describes the circumstances surrounding this instance of successful drug-user organizing in order to identify the lessons that can be learned. . La propuesta parecia estar destinada a fracasar, ya que no contaba con el apoyo del gobierno tailand?s y porque las intervenciones que se proponfan eran altamente incongruentes con las politicas nacionales. En medio de una guerra de drogas que se libraba, la TDN tom? medidas para aumentar el conocimiento sobre los danos de la guerra de drogas, las deficiencias de las politicas de GFATM y la necesidad de intervenciones impulsadas por los propios usuarios. En este articulo se describen las circunstancias en torno a este caso en que se creo una organizaci?n exitosa de usuarios de drogas a fin de identificar las lecciones que se pueden aprender. In many settings, drug user organizations have been at the forefront of such victories. They have emerged in response to epidemics of HIV/AIDS and overdose and have been instrumental in bringing to light the deplorable human rights conditions that drug users commonly face.5 These organizations have garnered increasing attention in recent years due to their ability to address gaps in traditional public health interventions and their ability to initiate highly effective forms of activism, advocacy, and public education.6-8
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM). 9 The proposal was controversial and appeared destined to fail because it did not have the support of the Thai government and because the interventions proposed within it were highly incongruent with national policies. In the midst of a horrific "drug war" associated with widespread human rights violations in Thailand, TDN mobilized drug users and their supporters and engaged in various coalition-building and direct-action initiatives to ensure that their proposal to the GFATM was given appropriate consideration.10 They also wanted to be certain that problematic policies associated with the GFATM were addressed. We have sought to describe the circumstances surrounding this particular instance of drug user organizing in order to identify the lessons that can be learned from it and applied in other settings.
The Thai Drug Users' Network
The Thai Drug Users' Network was formed to address the deplorable health and human rights situation confronting drug users in Thailand. The organization evolved out of a meeting initially set up to discuss the findings of a human rights documentation project based on 33 first-hand testimonials of Thai injection drug users (IDUs) care among IDUs as well their experiences with Thai police and the judicial system.'2 The testimonials revealed an array of rights violations, including instances of arbitrary arrest and torture, discrimination in judicial and health care settings, and a lack of access to essential health information and materials. 13 The results of the project were presented to indigenous leaders within the Thai IDU community and later presented to the National Human Rights Commission and the Thai Parliament. In response to the findings, leaders from the Thai IDU community decided to establish the Thai Drug Users' Network, which is now an organization that is national in scope and includes over 100 current and former drug users from various regions in Thailand. Later that year, TDN and a number of their international partners determined that more had to be done to counter the harmful effects of the drug war and the ongoing discrimination against drug users in health care settings. Deciding that TDN needed to build its capacity to develop its own to drug user-run prevention, care, and support programs, the group elected to submit a proposal for a peerdriven intervention to the Global Fund.
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria is an independent nonprofit foundation that was established in 2002 to attract and disburse funds for the prevention, treatment, and care of AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria in low-and low-to-middle-income countries.27 Funding priority is given to countries with the highest incidence of disease and the fewest resources to respond to those diseases. 28 The GFATM operates on a performancebased financing mechanism and has pledged $4.8 billion to fund 214 proposals among 121 countries through 2008. 29 The GFATM promotes "national ownership" and encourages innovative public-private partnerships.30 To put this principle into practice, the GFATM requires that applications be endorsed by a Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), which should, ideally, be chaired by a senior member of the relevant national government and include representation from the private, academic, community, nongovernmental, development, and faith sectors, as well as people living with HIV/AIDS, TB, or malaria.31 Thus, applications to the GFATM must involve, and be supported by, national governments. While this model may help to facilitate country ownership and efficient use of resources, the level of partnership required can also create barriers for many applicants.
Some of the problems arising from the CCM requirements were anticipated by the GFATM, which created criteria to adjudicate non-CCM applications. Specifically, non-CCM applications can be considered under the following exceptional circumstances: 1) when countries are without a legitimate government; 2) when countries are in conflict or facing a natural disaster; and 3) if countries suppress or have not established partnerships with civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).32 These criteria did not pose challenges for the GFATM through the first two rounds of proposal review, during which time five non-CCM proposals were approved.33 Three of these instances involved applications from Madagascar, a country without a CCM, and two other proposals were approved on the condition that CCM support would eventually be obtained. 34 There are, however, limitations associated with the current GFATM CCM criteria that become amplified in circumstances in which people with HIV or at risk for HIV are experiencing human rights violations within their own country and are denied effective prevention, care, and treatment interventions. In these situations, a country may have an established CCM and partnerships with civil society organizations and NGOs, but proposed public health interventions may be highly incongruent with national government policies. The most obvious example of this pertains to nonabstinence-based HIV prevention, or "harm reduction," programs for injection drug users, such as sterile syringe provision strategies, which, despite the evidence of their effectiveness, remain unpopular among many governments in both lower-and higher-income countries.35-37 During the GFATM's third-round review, the aforementioned limitation was exposed by an application from TDN to implement a peer-driven HIV prevention and care intervention for Thai Inside the GFATM Board meeting, there was considerable debate concerning the TDN proposal. The submission of this proposal created a dilemma for the GFATM for several reasons and rendered the proposal simultaneously difficult to accept or reject. First, the proposal did not clearly meet any of the three non-CCM criteria. Although the application appeared to meet the third criterion (that is, coming from a country that suppressed or failed to establish partnerships with civil society/NGOs), in reality, two of the applicants listed on the TDN proposal were members of the national CCM, and one (Raks Thai Foundation) had already been funded by the GFATM for other CCM-approved work in Round Two. Second, the proposal was technically sound, included evidence-based interventions, and involved partnerships with internationally recognized academic and NGO partners. Third, the applicants had secured credible letters of support from various organizations from within and outside of Thailand, supporting the applicants' claim that CCM approval was not possible. Fourth, the application stated that during the first two rounds of GFATM reviews, representatives of Thai NGOs had made several appeals to the county's established CCM to submit a proposal to address the HIV prevention and care needs of IDUs. These appeals had reportedly been dismissed and ignored, which in turn, prompted the submission of the non-CCM application in the GFATM's third round.
In order for applicants to be considered without CCM approval, the GFATM required that they state why the proposal could not be submitted with CCM approval, and the following reasons were provided:
1) The government of Thailand, and Thai society in general does not currently recognize the value of harm reduction; 2) While there are public health officials in government positions who support harm reduction, they are currently uable to express this support publicly given the current policy environment; 3) the applicants made contact with the Thai CCM, and it was indicated clearly that the proposal would not receive the required support from all CCM members; 4) in light of current Thai drug policies, harm reduction programming is urgently needed, and it is drug users themselves who are in the best position to deliver harm reduction programming since their peers may be reluctant to participate in similar government-initiated programs, as participation could be perceived to carry the risk of arrest, mandatory treatment and HIV testing -fears that could be further exacerbated given many existing practices, such as the sharing of information concerning drug users between hospitals and police; and 5) the applicants firmly believe that the Thai government will permit the proposed pilot project to proceed.48
The debate at the GFATM Board meeting concerning the Thai proposal took various turns. Non-voting community representatives expressed their support for the pro-posal, although there was opposition to the proposal by South East Asian delegates with voting privileges, who argued that the proposal should not have been screened in and should be sent back for consideration in the GFATM's fourth round. Varying reports circulating outside the meeting suggested that the Board had reached consensus; that consensus had been broken; and that consensus had again been reached. There were also reports indicating that some Board members were only prepared to vote in favor of the proposal if TDN and Raks Thai Foundation gained endorsement from the Thai CCM -an approach that the GFATM Board had taken with previous non-CCM proposals. By the end of the meeting, the GFATM Board had bravely approved the application despite the lack of support from Thailand's CCM, and despite the fact that the application had failed to clearly meet any of the GFATM non-CCM exemptions.49 It was later learned that the Technical Review Panel of the GFATM had scored the proposal very highly; that they had had very few criticisms of it; and that the proposal had gone to the GFATM Board having been highly recommended for funding.
There was, however, some fallout from the approval of this particular proposal, although some of it was positive. It was reported that some GFATM Board members had requested that the GFATM Secretariat apologize to the Board for screening in the proposal for review. Additionally, in the wake of the approval of the TDN proposal, the GFATM portfolio manager for Thailand was moved to another country, with many observers feeling that this was, in part, punishment for his having screened in the TDN proposal for technical review. Finally, since the GFATM approved the non-CCM application from Thailand, but did so outside of its stated criteria, the GFATM Board asked the GFATM Secretariat to re-examine its non-CCM criteria and generate options and recommendations that can be applied for future rounds of the GFATM.
Conclusion
The Thai Drug Users' Network, despite being a new organization, managed to quickly mobilize its membership in the fight to promote the health and human rights of IDUs HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS living in Thailand. Like many of the more powerful responses to the AIDS epidemic that were not based on expert-driven interventions but rather on mobilizing affected communities to resist oppression, TDN repeatedly made those in the private and public arenas well aware of the concerns of drug users, garnered support, and built coalitions in the face of a brutal government-sponsored war against people allegedly involved with illicit drugs.50,51 TDN grew out of a response to the findings of a local human rights documentation project, which, consistent with TDN's future efforts, had resulted from an effective collaboration between Thai and non-Thai organizations. By documenting and presenting the horrific health and human rights conditions faced by Thai IDUs, TDN founders gave voice to a highly marginalized population with few opportunities to speak for themselves. This approach is similar to that used by other drug user organizations, such as the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users, whose initial objective was to make public "the cry of suffering users."52 TDN's efforts served to quickly mobilize its membership, who subsequently took swift and courageous action to publicly address the harms caused by a violent governmentsponsored drug war, despite the obvious risks associated with such actions.
A further key to the success of TDN was the ongoing and constant development of coalitions within and outside of Thailand. TDN worked tirelessly with various international agencies, as well, including the United Nations and the World Health Organization, which, in turn, increased the profile and credibility of the organization. TDN has also been remarkably successful in increasing public awareness of the ongoing war against Thai drug users. Through media alerts, the development of an "International Day of Action," and collaboration with human rights organizations, TDN ensured that the international community was made well aware of the human rights violations behind the reported success of the Thai government's drug war. This, in turn, created new pressures for both the Thai government and the GFATM Board as they considered TDN's application.
The experience surrounding TDN's application also raises important questions concerning the policies and practices of the GFATM as it attempts to address diseases that commonly occur among populations that are highly marginalized.53,54 For instance, many of the most rapidly spreading HIV epidemics are presently being driven by injection drug use, as is indicated by Thailand's epidemic. [55] [56] [57] [58] In many of these settings, however, HIV-prevention interventions, such as methadone maintenance therapy and sterile syringe provision, remain unsupported by governments and, in many instances, are illegal.59, 60 The GFATM may soon announce the establishment of new non-CCM application criteria. A decision to expand the criteria would have widespread implications for those prevention and care efforts that have been validated scientifically but remain unpopular among politicians in many settings. 6162 The development of formal criteria that would foster the consideration of relevant non-CCM approved proposals for funding would serve to send a strong message to the international community that the GFATM will do whatever it takes to combat HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria and, in doing so, would establish the primacy of health and human rights over national and international politics.
Drug user organizations throughout the world have demonstrated that they can organize themselves to resist oppression and advocate for the recognition of their right to health.63 TDN worked tirelessly to build coalitions, increase public awareness, and counter state-sponsored messages concerning the ongoing drug war. Eventually, through concerted and coordinated actions, they challenged and overcame a flawed policy of one of the world's largest international health funding agencies. This experience demonstrates the powerful role that affected communities can play in addressing their health and human rights concerns and suggests a need to explore novel methods for incorporating the activities of these communities into existing public health, education, and policy-making frameworks.
